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STEPHAN VAN GALEN 
 
1. SHAPING EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES 
A perspective from the Netherlands1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The governance of Dutch universities has undergone several significant changes 
over the past half century, most of which find their parallels in other continental 
European countries. Major changes in governance structures have been implemented 
by successive Dutch governments seeking to deal with issues such as the sharp 
increase in numbers of students and staff from the mid-1960s, reform of university 
curricula in the 1970s, and the balance between academic freedom and 
accountability in the 1980s. The growth of Dutch universities between the 1960s and 
1980s was a major impetus for change, as it was across the rest of Europe. This 
tumultuous period was followed by a period of relative stability and consolidation 
coupled with an only marginal increase or even slow decline in student numbers 
between 1990 and 2000; during this period, critical reforms of university governance 
have made Dutch universities more autonomous, flexible, and innovative. In 
continental Europe, comparable reforms have taken place with the aim of 
strengthening the executive capacity of universities and to deal with the effects of 
mass higher education (Ritzen, 2010, p. 162). The reform agendas had a number of 
items in common, including the enhancement of institutional autonomy, the 
professionalisation of institutional leadership and administration, and the 
introduction of more competitive, performance-oriented funding models (Gornitzka, 
Maassen, & De Boer, 2017, p. 274; Hicks, 2012; Westerheijden, 2018). 
 The sustained growth of universities from 2010 onwards, and the market-driven 
and network-based mode of governance of the 21th century present challenges to 
Dutch and European universities, as their many stakeholders have divergent policy 
goals and expectations concerning university strategy and policy. This is of course 
one of the results of the success of Universities, as Noorda (2018) has observed 
Universities are wanted, “they are seen as essential engines of development, fertile 
grounds for new generations of professionals, and indispensable providers of smart 
solutions to future questions” (p. 25). Governments have developed policies to 
improve the contribution of Universities to the Knowledge Society, but, as we will 
see, these policies have met with only partial success (Van Vught, 2008, pp. 151, 
164–172). 
 In this paper, I describe and analyse the development of university governance in 
the Netherlands from circa 1960 until the present, and argue that in the current multi-
actor network-based mode of governance, a stronger role for the European Union in 
University governance could serve to focus and strengthen the quality and impact of 
education, research, and innovation of European Universities. Universities operate 
in an international context, and the governance of Universities should therefore also 
be reconsidered from this perspective. 
–––––––––––––– 
1 Strike, T., Nicholls, J. & Rushforth, J. (Eds.), 2019, Governing Higher Education Today: International 
Perspectives, Routledge, Abingdon, UK. 
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 The Bologna process, which aimed to introduce the bachelor-master system 
across Europe to promote mobility within Europe, still lacks a European statue for 
Universities and a single European Accreditation Agency. Bologna is potentially a 
boost to the competitiveness of European universities. However, the implementation 
seems too nation-specific, so that the transparency of European universities has not 
increased as much as could be possible. Transparency is important as it is well known 
that the Higher Education market has some major imperfections. To correct these 
imperfections, credible and independent information is needed for students and 
society at large, so that they are able to judge the quality of education and research 
(Van Vught, 2008, p. 167). The current system of governance has rightly been 
characterised by De Boer, Enders, and Leisyte (2007) as  
 
a complex jumble, more and more a hybrid combination of multiple coordination 
forms. It is a blend in which hierarchies, markets, networks and communities are 
conveyed without clear dominance of any one of them. Within these realities the 
university as an organization has come to the fore […] as a corporate actor. (p. 
30) 
 
I conclude in the sections below that this corporate actor has been severely tied up 
in a bewildering web of contradictory government regulation, as governments 
increasingly realize the importance of Universities to the development of society and 
the economy. The present system of governance of Dutch Universities has as a result 
become increasingly incoherent and problematic. Universities, in short, run the risk 
of becoming unmanageable. I will argue that the ‘Macron initiative’ to create 
European Universities could offer a way out of the jungle of recent policy reforms, 
as a first step to a new governance paradigm that takes into consideration the 
international character of Universities. 
 
UNIVERSITIES BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND CONTROL 
 
Dutch higher education has a binary system, which means that a distinction is made 
between research-oriented education and higher professional education. This 
difference in orientation has continued to exist after the introduction of the bachelor-
master degree structure in 2002. Research-oriented education takes place primarily 
at research universities, universiteiten, and higher professional education at 
universities of applied sciences, hogescholen. As well as the different objectives, 
each of the two types of education has its own admission requirements, programme 
duration, and governance structures. The Dutch research universities are the only 
institutions of higher education in the Netherlands allowed to award PhD degrees. 
This paper limits itself to the governance of government-funded research 
universities. 
Independence 
The post-war growth of universities resulted in 1960 in a significant change in the 
governance structure of Dutch Universities. In 1960 universities got the status of an 
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independent legal entity formally disconnected from the state as a result of the new 
law on Scientific Education, Wet op het Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs. 
 





















This autonomy was nowhere more clearly manifest, or concrete, than in the transfer 
of legal ownership of university buildings from the State to the University. Although 
the State remained financially responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the 
buildings until 1995, those buildings were from 1961 formally owned by the 
university. Buying and selling, building new laboratories, lecture theatres, or office 
space now became the prerogative of the university. Although it is clear from, for 
example, the archives of the University of Groningen that it took a while before civil 
servants from central and local governments really got to grips with the new reality 
(University of Groningen, 1961). Departments of planning and real estate were 
created at each university to assist and advice management with the complexities of 
real estate planning and development. In fact, universities had grown so fast, that it 
had become unfeasible for central government to deal with the demands of university 
real estate on a central basis. The continuous and unprecedented growth of student 
numbers during the 1960s and the associated increase in the numbers of staff would 
however also end this new-found but rather short-lived autonomy. The state soon 
felt pressured to intervene in university policy, and a new order, characterised by an 
increase in state intervention, dawned at the end of the 1960s. 
 
Democracy  
Universities in the Netherlands were until the 1970s governed by a duplex ordo 
consisting of a mainly honorific board of regents, curatoren, who oversaw the 
administrative side of the University; its tasks were de facto executed by the 
Secretary-General, secretaris, of the University, who was the head of the 
administrative staff, and on the other hand, the Senate, composed of full professors, 
who were in charge of education and research, chaired by the rector magnificus. 
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According to Ritzen (2010), the Dutch university system “very much resembled the 
Humboldt system of academic oligarchy” (p. 161). 
 The University Government Reorganisation Act of 1970 (WUB) fundamentally 
changed the 19th-century order at Dutch Universities. The Act can be seen as a 
response to the May 1969 revolts at the campuses of Dutch universities, but from an 
international perspective neither student ideologies nor student tactics were really 
original. Students derived their ideas from the United States, Paris, and Germany. 
Student agitation was, according to Daalder (1982), therefore far from original or 
persistent. The main driver behind the 1970 Act must be found in universities 
themselves. The increase in student number had led to a large increase in university 
staff. The senate became unmanageable and younger staff members were generally 
excluded from the senate. This led to cries for the professionalisation of the 
university on the one hand and the demands for more democracy on the other hand 
from junior staff (Daalder, 1982, pp. 178–180) 
 The 1970 Act introduced a condominium of two bodies, an Executive Board, 
College van Bestuur, and a University Council, Universiteitsraad. The Council was 
elected by and from three different constituencies, and one sixth of its members were 
appointed by the crown on the nomination of the elected members from society at 
large. The Executive Board was a mixture of appointed and elected members. The 
law did not introduce ‘direct democracy’ nor did it present the university community 
with some sort of ‘parliamentary’ university government, but it had some far-
reaching consequences. The Act, in short, navigated between introducing 
‘democracy’ and ‘management’. 
 The relation between the Executive Board and the University Council was one of 
the most controversial issues in the implementation of the 1970 Act. Members of 
Parliament (MPs) demanded that the University Council be the sole sovereign body 
in matters of university government and that the Executive Board should have no 
independent powers. They demanded a parliamentary democracy model. The 
Executive Board however got powers of its own and a guaranteed tenure for a fixed 
period. The Board was to inform the council, but was not only responsible to the 
Council, but also first and foremost to the Minister for the proper exercise of its 
powers (Daalder, 1982, pp. 173–175). 
 The relation between the University Council and the Executive Board has 
changed significantly since 1970, but it has remained rather complex. From 1970 the 
powers of the Executive Board have increased step by step, as successive 
governments addressed the university as an independent entity. Steering University 
policy required a single addressee for central government, and the University 
Council embodied the anarchistic, devolved institution, which had proved immune 
to government interference. Interestingly, recent amendments to the current law have 
increased the influence of the University Council again in an apparent attempt to 
curb institutional autonomy. The question remains for how long this trend can 
continue; by increasing the powers of the devolved institution central government 
automatically diminishes its own ability to steer University policy. A clear example 
is given by De Boer et al. (2007): 
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In December 1990, the minister and the chief executive boards of the universities 
reached an official gentlemen’s agreement after lengthy negotiations with respect 
to the main policy objectives (the so-called Hoofdlijnenakkoorden 1990–1993). 
However, this agreement could hardly be described as effective since a number 
of university councils, having the formal authority to do so, rejected the 
agreement. The then existing governing model of ‘mixed leadership’ of Dutch 
universities, in which both the executive and the elected councils had decision-
making powers, created a situation in which the relevant minister could not make 
a credible agreement. In other words, the government’s attempt to steer this sector 
were frustrated by not having an addressee. (p. 31) 
 
The 1970 Act did not stop at defining the governance of the university at the central 
level, it also prescribed the internal organisation of Faculties, with elected Faculty 
councils and even further down the line so-called vakgroepen or academic 
disciplines organised in Departments, which were to be governed by all academic 
and non-academic staff in a certain discipline in a vakgroep board. This complex 
structure was only fully implemented in 1982, after years of experimenting and 
drafting new rules and regulations on all levels. Faculty regulations required 
approval at the university level, and university rules needed approval from the 
ministry. Organisational autonomy, or the ability for institutions to decide on their 
own internal governance structures as well as to develop their own procedures to 
select their institutional leadership, is still limited across Europe in general. In many 
European counties, the organisational autonomy is restricted by national legislation, 
regulations, and guidelines. In the other words, the state frames the organisational 
structure of European institutions to a large extent. Only a few countries in 
continental Europe have implemented reforms that have seriously transferred to the 
universities the power to decide on their internal governance structure (Daalder, 
1982, pp. 176–177; De Boer, 2018). 
 The fiction that central government could command and control university policy 
through the issuing of detailed regulations of course fitted the general opinion at the 
time that society was manageable, but nowhere was this idea more thoroughly 
embedded in legislation than in higher education. The expanding detail interference 
of central government oversaw these changes by means of an expanding range of 
laws, decrees, procedures, regulations, and administrative supervision. At the same 
time, academic matters were almost exclusively the domain of the professionals. In 
fact, academic self-governance (regarding academic matters) and state regulation 
(regarding non-academic matters) went hand in hand (De Boer et al., 2007, p. 29). 
The introduction of elected councils on all levels across the institution meant of 
course that university decision making came to a virtual standstill during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. The system created by the 1970 Act was inspired by the concept of 
‘worker self-determination’ as practised in communist Eastern Europe at the time. 
Almost all members of staff were automatically members of the departmental board. 
As a result, board meetings of disciplines, institutes, or laboratories were often 
conducted in an Auditorium. Everything had to be agreed upon by everyone, and as 
a result little was achieved. Willem Frederik Hermans, a lecturer in physical 
geography at the University of Groningen, as a literary author famous for his 
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venomous pen, described university life in a bitter and satirical manner in an 
interview with the newspaper NRC in 1973 just before he left the Netherlands for his 
self-chosen ‘exile’ in Paris: 
 
Ever since the introduction of ‘democracy’ we are obliged to spend our time 
babbling in endless meetings. Imagine you need rubber bands. A days meeting 
will not be enough […] Any idea about the costs? A professor spending his days 
chattering? But anyway, meetings are not the only thing. After the meeting forms 
need to be filled-in, letters need to be written […] all in all a waste of time and 
money. (Hermans, 1973) 
 
The vision underlying the democratisation of university governance structures across 
Europe assumed that the performance of the university would be improved by 
reducing the influence of professors, and enhancing the involvement of non-
professorial academic staff, administrative staff, and students in university 
governance. The result was that after the 1970s, decision-making power was 
concentrated in democratically elected, representative councils. This implied that all 
major decisions, for example, in the budget and personnel areas, of the university 
leadership had to be approved by one or more democratic councils (Gornitzka et al., 
2017, p. 278). 
 Daalder (1982) concludes that more democracy within the university did not lead 
to more autonomy from central government; the new governance was the result of 
intervention from government in the first place. Central government engaged on the 
contrary in more detailed intervention in response to the challenge of increasing 
student numbers. The reforms that followed the 1970 Act did not make the 
universities more open to change, whether prompted from within or from the outside, 
and all the new regulatory powers did not provide government with more control, 
but they did have a paralysing effect on the universities (Daalder, 1982, pp. 208, 
225). 
 Government introduced regulations in the early 1980s aimed to increase 
graduation rates, change the structure and content of curricula, push for competitive 
research funding, and rationalise the overall cost of the system. Furthermore, a 
conditional research funding system was introduced, but this system met with little 
success. These policies are defined as remedial or corrective, and they represented a 
clear attempt to shift towards New Public Management according to Westerheijden, 
De Boer, and Enders (2009). The 1970s reforms did not provide an answer to the 
general dissatisfaction with higher education, and higher education became a hot 
political issue during the 1970s and early 1980s (Capano, 2018).  
 
Autonomy 
The second half of the 1980s shows quite another governmental approach. Instead 
of structural intervention, the emphasis is on a government stepping back and an 
increase in autonomy of higher education institutions. This indicates a fundamental 
change in the governmental attitude towards universities. It shows the loss of 
confidence in the governments capacity to centrally plan and control the higher 
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education system and a willingness to take self-regulating capacities of Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) seriously (Van Vught, 1991, pp. 114–115, 126–127). 
 In 1985, a policy paper was published by the Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science of the Netherlands (MOCW, 1985), the Higher Education: Autonomy and 
Quality (in Dutch: HOAK) document, setting out guidelines for a new reform 
strategy. Roel in ‘t Veld, the main author of this paper, applied new insights from 
New Public Management (NPM) to Higher Education Governance (McDaniel, 
1997). This moment was a watershed not only in Dutch policy development but also 
in the evolution of higher education in continental Europe. This document was the 
first governmental declaration that the traditional strategy of command and control, 
which had characterised higher education for the previous century, had to be 
abandoned in favour of a steering-at-a-distance strategy. Autonomy and quality 
assessment were ideas/policy tools launched by that document and formalised by 
law in 1992 (Goedegebuure & Westerheijden, 1991). 
 In the HOAK document, a new steering philosophy as presented by the minister 
was deemed necessary because, according to the government, “‘many in and around 
the higher education system are of the opinion that the present administrative and 
legislative higher education mechanism can no longer be considered optimal to meet 
the future demands which have to be placed on the system” MOCW, 1985). The 
central concept of the philosophy presented is a substantial increase in the autonomy 
of the institutions through abolishing regulations, combined with the introduction of 
a system of retrospective quality control (Goedegebuure & Westerheijden, 1991, p. 
500). 
 Since the mid-1980s, a number of important powers regarding financial policy 
were transferred to the universities. First of all, government subsidies were 
transferred as lump-sum subsidies, granting universities financial discretion. Central 
university management is allowed to cross-subsidise teaching and research and to 
make their own distributions across their faculties and institutes. Regulations that 
had limited the use of income from sources other than the government were 
abandoned. On average, about 25% of a university’s budget stems from contract 
activities; at some universities, this percentage is more than 30%. Moreover, a priori 
ministerial approval of university budgets was dropped, and universities were 
granted independent borrowing powers. Since 1987, the universities have the power 
to appoint the professoriate without interference from the central government. 
Working conditions and labour relations are negotiated though the Association of 
Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) on behalf of the universities. Academics are 
no longer civil servants but employees of a university. Since 1992, universities also 
bear full costs of any severance pay. Another step in this development of university-
controlled resources has been the abolition of government involvement in the 
planning and funding of new buildings and building maintenance. Universities have 
owned their buildings since 1961, but they bear full costs only since 1995 (De Boer 
et al., 2007, p. 37). 
 The first half of the 1990s also saw the introduction of University Holdings, in 
which universities are the sole shareholders. The Holdings were a response to the 
growing importance of market-oriented activities. University Holdings are usually 
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composed of several businesses or companies (‘subsidiaries’) that ‘valorise’ 
scientific knowledge. Through this ‘privatization’ of activities that are linked to the 
university, Dutch universities react to the new task of ‘valorisation’ that the 
government allotted to them (De Boer et al., 2007, p. 37). 
 Universities however never received self-accrediting powers, also part of the 
HOAK philosophy, and consequently always needed government consent when 
starting new programmes. 
 The law that modernised University governance proposed by the then Minister of 
Education Ritzen in 1997 (MUB) was a further step towards more flexibility and 
autonomy for Universities. Professional boards were introduced at both the central 
and Faculty level, and management was no longer regarded as a part-time job. The 
role of ‘councils’ in decision making was reduced from co-deciders to advisers with 
a strong influence. The law created full accountability for the administration towards 
society. The administration was placed in the hands of an Executive Board of three 
members, to be selected by a Supervisory Board of five members appointed by the 
minister (Ritzen, 2010, pp. 169–171). 
 Greater accountability also means that higher education institutions have to 
redefine the ways in which they inform their stakeholders about their performances. 
The introduction of accreditation and the development of performance agreements 
should therefore be seen as a natural result of the development of a more independent 
university at the start of the 21th century. In the next two sections, the introduction 
and effects of accreditation and performance agreements as new tools for 




The biggest change in the higher education system in recent years was the 
introduction of the bachelor-master system in 2002 in order to increase students' 
international mobility (MOCW, 2018). In 2002, accreditation was introduced 
simultaneously to assure the quality of the new degree programmes. From 2003, the 
Accreditation Organisation of the Netherlands and Flanders (NVAO) has been 
responsible for the validation of all degrees in the Netherlands and Flemish-speaking 
Belgium. 
 In Europe in general, a similar evolution of governance systems took place at the 
same time, involving actors from various levels outside central government. 
Authorities and powers in higher education systems have consequently been 
redistributed across these levels (De Boer, 2018). In many countries, coordination 
has changed from a classical form of regulation dominated by a single actor, the 
state, to forms in which various actors at various system levels govern the system, 
like in the Netherlands and Flanders, for instance, the NVAO. Thus, in the 
Netherlands and in Europe, enhanced institutional autonomy has taken place 
together with higher levels of accountability, and more stringent and detailed 
procedures for quality assurance have been introduced. 
 In 2011, the Netherlands introduced a so-called institutional audit as part of a new 
two-tier accreditation system. This system aims to focus quality assurance and 
accreditation in higher education more exclusively on the content of the programme 
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and learning outcomes, and is intended to reduce the administrative burdens of 
internal and external quality assurance processes (Jongbloed, Kaiser, Van Vught, & 
Westerheijden, 2018, p. 672). 
 The aim of the institutional audit is to determine whether or not the Executive 
Board of an institution, on the basis of its vision regarding the quality of the 
education it provides, has in place an effective system of quality assurance that can 
guarantee the quality of the programmes. The central question is whether the 
Executive Board is ‘in control’, and as such the introduction of the institutional audit 
perfectly fits the steering-at-a-distance philosophy introduced by the HOAK paper 
and the MUB. This revision of the accreditation system should also have increased 
academic ownership of quality assurance systems within higher education 
institutions and have introduced a ‘light touch approach’ based on ‘high trust’ earned 
during 25 years of external quality assurance procedures introduced after the HOAK 
paper in 1986 (Van Galen, Dittrich, & Frederiks, 2013, pp. 1–25). In these 25 years, 
the system has undergone a profound shift from quality enhancement to 
accountability. The new two-tier accreditation system was intended to steer back to 
a more quality enhancement-led approach (Van Galen, Woutersen, Martens, & De 
Jonge, 2009, pp. 1–5). 
 The initiative for the revision of the accreditation system in the Netherlands came 
during the summer of 2007 from the Dutch minister for education Plasterk. The need 
for a revision of the system was broadly felt in the Netherlands. From the perspective 
of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), accreditation focussed too much on 
procedures and processes not directly relevant to education, was not cost-effective, 
and was felt to be too bureaucratic. HEIs felt that the system had become geared too 
much towards accountability and had almost lost the important enhancement 
function. From the government perspective, as well as from the perspective of 
politics, accreditation was not flexible enough to be able to react quickly to public 
concerns about quality issues in higher education. Students felt that accreditation 
was helpful in eliminating programmes that did not meet standards, but were also 
concerned that accreditation was focussing too much on the procedural end of quality 
assurance. Prior to 2007, this uneasiness with the accreditation system had initiated 
a debate, led by the Dutch Association of Universities (VSNU), advocating the 
adoption of institutional accreditation, leaving the assessment of individual 
programmes to the internal quality systems of HEIs. These proposals were not 
accepted by politicians and students (Van Galen et al., 2009). 
 After having conducted a thorough study of the development of accreditation 
processes on the institutional and programme level in several other continental 
European countries and having identified the strong and weak points of these 
systems, the first step taken by NVAO was to involve its European partners in the 
development of the basic set up of the system. In the discussion with the international 
partners, it became rapidly clear that many quality assurance systems in Europe are 
moving towards a mix of institutional review and programme assessment and seem 
to be converging towards a combined approach where institutional review and 
programme assessment complement each other (Van Galen et al., 2009). In Europe 
today, there is a general consensus about the design of external and internal quality 
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assurance systems. The 2015 Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the 
European Higher Education Area (ESG) from the European Association for Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA, 2015) reflect this consensus. A single 
European accreditation agency under EU law would be a significant step forward in 
the Bologna process as it can substantially increase transparency on the quality of 
provision and will certainly stimulate and facilitate mobility of staff and students 
within the EU (Jongbloed, Vossensteyn, Van Vught, & Westerheijden, 2018, pp. 
445–447). The proposed agency can build upon the work of ENQA and the European 




The introduction of performance agreements in 2012 is, like the introduction of 
accreditation, another example of the emergence of networked governance. This 
development was described by Jongbloed, Vossensteyn, et al. (2018, p. 444) as the 
result of the diversity of needs and approaches, combining state supervision with 
increased autonomy for institutions with a new focus on local networks of students, 
stakeholders, and government authorities. Networked governance relies more on 
negotiations, collaborations, and partnerships, it wideness perspectives from New 
Public Management’s (NPM) focus on efficiency and effectiveness to include public 
values such as social equity, societal impact, and value from knowledge (Jongbloed, 
Vossensteyn, et al., 2018, pp. 441–444), and as such can also be seen as the next step 
in the development of NPM. It should be noted that, of course, a substantial part of 
a university’s block grant has always in some way or another been tied to 
performance, as student numbers and numbers of degrees granted have for a long 
time already been part of the nation-wide funding mechanisms. 
 The new performance contracts tie a small part of the funding of universities to 
targets agreed beforehand with government. In the Netherlands, universities made 
agreements on increasing diversity in terms of degree programmes, student success 
rates, teaching qualifications for research staff, and, for example, the percentage of 
students participating in honours classes (Jongbloed, Kaiser, et al., 2018, pp. 677–
678). 
 The introduction of targets is the new element in the performance-based approach. 
For the period 2012–2016, 7% of the core grant for education, or about €130 million 
in total, was included in the agreements. An independent review committee was 
installed by the Minister of Education to oversee the performance agreements. The 
committee concluded in 2016 that many universities had achieved substantial 
success in meeting their targets. Completion rates had risen on average from 60% to 
74%, and dropout rates declined. The second objective, to stimulate diversity of 
provision, met with less success (Jongbloed, Kaiser, et al., 2018, pp. 678–684).  This 
should not come as a surprise as in the complex environment of university 
governance it is much harder for Executive Boards to force academics to introduce 
new study programmes and open up new avenues for research in areas desired by 
central government. The fact that the State has by law attributed responsibility for 
the quality of education directly to Deans of Faculties and also granted elected 
Faculty Councils co-decision rights on this subject makes central intervention in this 
SHAPING EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES 
 
11 
area of course difficult. The law governing higher education is also, on the one hand, 
centred around the concept of a degree programme, and accreditation still takes place 
at the programme level. This can be viewed as to be in conflict with the settlement 
of many powers, on the other hand, at the top level. As De Boer (2018) already 
concluded, “in Europe in general one can witness a growing recognition that 
relationships in higher education are extremely complex and dynamic, involving 
actors from various levels outside central government. Authorities and powers in 
higher education systems have consequently been redistributed across these levels” 
(pp. 2–3). This recognition has however not been met with a new and coherent 
approach by government in the design of new policy initiatives such as the 
performance agreements, and as such they can develop into a major barricade 
obstructing effective government steering (Van Vught, 2008).  
 Although Jongbloed, Kaiser, et al. (2018, p. 684) conclude that the performance 
agreements have met with a general approval by the public, the reception in 
parliament, by students and the universities, has been mixed. The focus of the 
agreements of indicators and targets has received much criticism and was one of the 
reasons that sparked the most serious riots since the 1960s at the University of 
Amsterdam (Gornitzka et al., 2017, pp. 274, 280). The next round of performance 
agreements will as a result be rebranded as Quality Agreements, stressing the fact 
that the agreements should enhance the quality of provision for students. The Review 
Committee will be superseded by NVAO, de facto creating a higher education 
authority. It can be questioned if the rebranding of the agreements will 
fundamentally change their character, and it is also questionable how the 
effectiveness of central steering by the Executive Board will be increased. A new 
measure to increase this effectiveness is the requirement to include the University 
Council in the drafting of the agreements. How effective this will be has to be seen. 
The fact that the composition of the University Council changes every year leaves a 
large question mark in this respect. Apart from this, the University Council bears no 




The governance structure of universities in the Netherlands, including the formal 
appointment procedure of the members of the universities’ Supervisory Board and 
Executive Board, have been laid down in the Higher Education and Research Act 
(WHW). There are three governing bodies at the central level: a Supervisory Board, 
Raad van Toezicht, consisting of a maximum of five external members, an Executive 
Board, College van Bestuur, consisting of a maximum of three members (including 
the rector), and the University Council, Universiteitsraad, an elected representative 
body for staff and students. Universities can determine themselves whether or not to 
split the University Council into two separate councils for staff and students. In 
essence, this is a clear example of the Rhineland-model of a two-tier board, with a 
representative council of elected students and staff for co-decision making. A Dutch 
speciality is the collegial board, where board members have an equal vote; the 
President’s vote only decides when no majority can be found otherwise. The 
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Supervisory Board and the Executive Board both operate on the basis of these 
principles. The principle of the collegial board means that board members work and 
operate on a more or less equal footing. It also means that sometimes the Rector 
Magnificus is the de facto chair of the board, although this position is normally 
reserved for the President of the board. Some universities have experimented with a 
system in which the role of President and Rector Magnificus are combined in one 




Supervisory Boards were created after 1995. The five members of this Council 
cannot be active politicians or (senior) civil servants from central government, and 
are generally CEOs of (large) multinationals or hospitals, senior judges, or directors 
of cultural institutions. The Supervisory Board of a public University is appointed 
by the minister of Education, Culture, and Research. The appointment of a member 
of the Supervisory Board has to be made on the basis of a job description and profile 
that has to be submitted for advice to the University Council. In practice, the 
appointments of members of the Supervisory Board are made more or less on the 
basis of co-optation. Civil servants at the ministry do not intervene in the process, 
and the selection of candidates is left to the Supervisory Board itself, although the 
possibility exists for ministers to intervene in the process, and some ministers have 
indeed done so, some appointing ‘political friends’. The University Council has the 
right to nominate a member of the Supervisory Board. This nomination should 
consist of more than one candidate. The member nominated by the University 
Council has the so-called ‘special confidence’ of the University Council. 
 The Supervisory Board’s main role is to oversee the work of the Executive Board 
and to advise the Board. The Supervisory Board appoints and dismisses the members 
of the Executive Board, designates the chairperson, and determines the amount of 
the remuneration of the Executive Board within the limits of the law. It approves 
University statutes and bylaws, the budget, the accounts, the annual report, and the 
strategic plan. From 2010 the Board is also responsible for the internal system of 
quality assurance (WHW art. 9.8). If and when the Supervisory Board neglects its 
duties, the Minister can force the Board to act and issue them a directive (WHW art. 
9.9 and 9.9a). 
 
Appointment procedure Executive Board. The Supervisory Board has to consult the 
University Council in a variety of ways before it appoints one of the three executives. 
The law is however quite unclear on the precise involvement of the University 
Council in the procedure as frequent changes of the WHW since 1997 have resulted 
in a legal structure that is sometimes contradictory and outdated. It is, for example, 
unclear how many times and at which moment the University Council should be 
involved in the appointment procedure, and what their rights precisely are (WHW 
art. 9.3-3, 9.33a-3, 9.40).  
 The appointment of a member of the Executive Board has to be made on the basis 
of a job description and profile that has to be submitted for advice to the University 
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Council. The Supervisory Board subsequently appoints a selection committee. The 
University Council has the right to nominate two members of this committee, one 
nominee representing the students and one representing the staff. The number of 
committee members taking part in the selection process is not prescribed and is left 
to the discretion of the Supervisory Board. The selection committee advices the 
Supervisory Board on the appointment of a candidate, but the Supervisory Board 
decides in the end whom to appoint, but not before the Supervisory Board has again 
consulted the University Council on the proposed appointment. Ministerial consent 
or approval is not required for the appointment of members of the Executive Board. 
More detailed procedures about the nomination and appointment of executives can 
be laid down in university bylaws. The WHW explicitly indicates that, for example, 
the Supervisory Board can consult the Deans before taking a decision on the 
appointment of the Rector. The law thus provides an opening for the involvement of 
Deans in the process, but at the same time it is not clear how this special involvement 
of the Deans is to be reconciled with the formal procedure described above. In sum, 
the appointment procedure for members of the Executive Board has become almost 
unmanageable, and leads to confusion of the roles of the different stakeholders. The 
University Council has gradually been granted more influence in the process, but 
earlier and overlapping and conflicting rights of this elected council have not been 
removed from the law when new features were added, leading to a cumbersome 




The Executive Board is charged with the management and administration of the 
university as a whole. The President of the Executive Board is the legal 
representative of the university. The Board appoints the deans, who have full 
authority in faculties. The Board also appoints the director(s) of the administration 
and services who in turn control those departments. The Executive Board was in full 
control of the budget until 2015, but recent changes to the WHW have re-introduced 
co-decision powers for the University Council. The council has now the right to 
approve the outline of the budget. However, the law does not specify what has to be 
considered an ‘outline’ and what not. The second round of performance agreements, 
or ‘quality agreements’, have to be made with the Department of Education by the 
Executive Board in joint agreement with the University Council. This has partly 
reintroduced the situation of the 1970s in which university decision making can be 
brought to a standstill if there is no agreement between the University Council and 
the Executive Board. As a result, central government will also lose the ability to steer 
the university from a distance as it is not clear who is actually in charge, and, as 
mentioned earlier, frequent changes in the composition of the University Council 
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The members of the University Council represent the academic community. They 
constitute the highest democratically elected body within the governance of the 
university. Delegates are elected by the students from their midst. Staff elect an equal 
number of representatives from among them every other year. The members jointly 
appoint a chairperson – either or not from their midst (University of Groningen, 
2018). Universities can choose to replace the University Council with separate 
councils for staff and students, in which case there is an obligation to convene 
delegates from those councils in a joined meeting when discussing University 
Strategy, or for example the budget. This then results in three councils instead of one 
(Radboud University, 2018). 
 The University Council consults with the Executive Board regarding University-
wide policy on teaching, research, finances, and human resources. The Council 
provides the Board with solicited and unsolicited advice, and has the right of consent 
on University Strategy, Quality Assurance, University bylaws and statutes, labour 
conditions, and several other topics. The Council also has the right to advice on a 
variety of other issues (WHW 9.33 and 9.33a).  
 
A GOVERNANCE JUNGLE 
 
Capano (2018) showed that between 1988 and 2015 “the Dutch government has 
clearly and repeatedly stated the goals of its design” (p. 687). These goals consist of 
an increase in the graduation rate, the internationalisation of the system, and profiling 
and institutional differentiation. The emphasis may have changed over time; 
however, the same basic goals have been pursued and effectively communicated to 
universities. As noted above, in the last few years government policy in the field of 
University governance has however become unclear and contradictory 
(Westerheijden et al., 2009). It seems, thus, that there is no such clear vision on the 
direction of governance in higher education that relates to the wider policy objectives 
of the government in the development of the Knowledge Economy. On the contrary, 
increased autonomy and consumer sovereignty or the relative privatisation of Higher 
Education have failed to consider the importance of reputation and the race to the 
top. According to Van Vught (2008), the dynamics of Higher Education are first and 
foremost a result of the competition for reputation. Reputation brings in resources, 
and this leads to an increase in mimicking behaviour amongst HEIs (pp. 166–172). 
 
Apart from the examples given in the previous sections, there are several more 
occasions in which government policies enacted in recent years will lead to 
indecisiveness at the university level. One major example is that, instead of 
introducing institutional accreditation, which should have been the logical 
consequence of the introduction of the institutional audit, and which would have 
been the jewel in the crown of the Ritzen reforms of 1997, Minister Bussemaker, in 
carrying out the student-loan policies of her liberal predecessor Zijlstra, re-
introduced co-decision rights on ‘the main items’ of the University budget for the 
University Council, without describing what is meant with ‘the main items’. This is 
perfectly in line with the theory of a networked governance, but a serious 
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impediment to an effective executive. Another example is a recent law providing co-
decision powers to the representative Programme Boards that overlap with the 
powers of the elected Faculty Council. A situation has been created in which two 
representative councils composed of staff and students can hold each other hostage 
if they do not agree on certain rules and regulations over which they have co-decision 
authority. Ironically, the 2016 law was christened the ‘Law on Enhanced 
Governance’. Admittedly, amendments to the law, like the one discussed 
immediately above, were not a result of a conscious government policy, but rather 
the result of spontaneous interruptions of activist MPs, but government caved in to 
the demands of parliament, and in doing so it has created all the circumstances that 
make it possible for a university to spiral out of control. 
 This return of overregulation and micromanagement can seriously hinder the 
successes of higher education. I believe that more autonomy within higher education 
will improve the performance of our institutions and, as the result of that, of the 
higher education system overall. The rationale for this belief rests on the autonomous 
higher education institution being able to control and steer its outcomes and 
performance. The reforms of the past few years are a serious obstacle in this respect. 
Noorda (2018, pp. 25–26) observed that autonomy is the conditio sine qua non of 
Universities; how could they otherwise have the capacity and freedom to inquire, to 
teach, and to criticise or approve? But Noorda also, and rightly so, states that 
Universities should ‘realise that they are partners in a social contract’. Governments 
and society at large have realized that Universities are too important to be left alone. 
This should be seen as the main reason behind increased government regulation in 
the last decade. Therefore, it should be noted that university autonomy is not carved 
in stone forever. Universities are bound and steered by the dynamics of economic 
realities, political preferences, business priorities, and social diversity (Noorda, 
2018, pp. 25–26). In general, this means that we need to find a new trade-off between 
autonomy and accountability in the design of the governance of Higher Education. 
The big question is whether or not this new solution can be found at the national 
level, or should be constructed in the context of the international arena in which 




The European Universities initiative, as first outlined by the former Dutch Minister 
of Education Jo Ritzen in 2010 in his book A chance for European Universities and, 
perhaps unconsciously, embraced by the French President Emanuel Macron in a 
speech at the Sorbonne in 2017, presents a way of strengthening and deepening 
existing successful university collaborations. It is also an opportunity to form new 
partnerships across Europe (Ritzen, 2010). The idea of the European University is a 
significant opportunity to bring the governance of European Universities more in 
line with their increasing European character and enhance and bolster their 
effectiveness and role in European society as promotors of European citizenship and 
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producers of high-skilled graduates. Although the Macron-version of the idea of a 
European University is perhaps the result of a ‘quintessential’ French solution to 
tackle institutional change in Higher Education; to add a new category of institutions 
to affect institutional change on a larger scale. 
 The European Universities initiative could be the basis of a new contract between 
Europe and its Universities. According to The Guild of European Research-Intensive 
Universities: it can build on the role of universities as engines for innovation and 
policy impact, and improve the quality of education and research by pooling 
resources. These communities of universities can further reinforce the interchange 
between research, teaching, and innovation, and strengthen the institutional 
excellence through the exchange of people, knowledge, and ideas in a trusted space. 
Establishing deeper collaboration will also provide a great opportunity to foster 
European identities and contribute to the education of a more internationally minded 
and flexible work force (The Guild, 2018, p. 1).  
 The European Universities initiative will enable universities to jointly develop 
new and transformative strategies for becoming truly European, through networks 
that each have their unique selling points and a mission to act as models for the 
university sector (The Guild, 2018, p. 1). To enable this transition, Universities need 
a European statue with a single principal: the European Commission, and a 
European-wide accreditation and quality control system. Ritzen (2010) has 
suggested that a special statute for European universities can contribute to a solution; 
the university would be accountable to a single agency related to the European 
Commission. Such a European University then should retain its block grants 
originally allocated by national government, but have them transferred to the 
independent European agency. It also should be able to compete for research grants 
in all European countries (Ritzen, 2010, pp. 128–129). 
CONCLUSION 
For Dutch Universities to be effective, they need autonomy, a clear strategic focus, 
and a strong commitment to deliver on their objectives in a continuous dialogue with 
their stakeholders. The introduction of a European statue with European quality 
control and accreditation can maximise the impact of Universities in a European 
context. The professionalisation of the Dutch University sector over the last 50 years 
has made these universities world-class providers of education and research. The 
current trend in Dutch politics to reintroduce elements of the ‘workers’ paradise 
doctrine’ of the 1970s will seriously harm the quality of provision in the Netherlands 
and undermine the leading position of Dutch Universities, as it can cause a standstill 
in decision-making processes. The EU initiative to create European Universities can 
offer a way forward for institutions that have already become truly international. 
According to The Guild it, is crucial that Universities participating in the European 
University project share a joint vision for the future, and that the underlying 
objectives of organisational integration and of creating educational quality are 
defined from the beginning. The networks must be governed with maximum 
effectiveness and minimum extra bureaucracy (The Guild, 2018, p. 1). The 
governance of the network could at the start be based on regular meetings by the 
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university leaderships, which would take ownership of the network’s success. To 
distinguish themselves from traditional types of university partnerships, networks of 
European universities should commit to the creation of a common pool of physical, 
virtual, intellectual, and administrative resources to be used by their communities 
(The Guild, 2018, p. 1). 
 In order to be successful, the initiative must be bold and ambitious and build on a 
concerted action from universities, governments, and EU institutions. The support 
should not only cover the provision of long-term funding but also a commitment to 
achieve mutual recognition of degrees and resolve barriers to mobility as well as 
differences in quality assurance that exist between many European countries. The 
governments and national agencies should enable enough flexibility for the piloting 
of solutions leading to the interoperability of regulatory environments (The Guild, 
2018, p. 2). In sum, the European Universities initiative should reflect the fact that 
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